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Introduction: Objections to Evolution
In the infamous Scopes “Monkey trial” of 1925, John Scopes,
a substitute high school biology teacher in Tennessee, was
prosecuted for violating legislation against the teaching of
Darwinian evolution. Since this trial and the film “Inherit the
Wind,” that dramatized it, the American South has been
stereotyped as antievolutionist, based on a Biblical literalist
fundamentalism. While there is certainly some truth to this
stereotype, the reality then and now is more complicated. The
prosecuting lawyer for the state of Tennessee, for instance,
was a former three-time Democratic presidential candidate
from Illinois, William Jennings Bryan, who may have argued
against evolution on the basis of its conflict with the Bible but
also opposed it on the basis of his worries about its apparent
implications for human equality (Smith 1966, pp. 59–60).
This worry about the political implications of evolution has
also been apparent more recently. After the initial publication
of his Sociobiology in 1975, with its evolutionary approach
to humans, E. O. Wilson was picketed and protested not by
Biblical literalists but by activists of the political left, who
objected not on the basis of traditional religious beliefs but
on the basis of what they believed to be its undermining of
progressive ideals against racism, sexism, and fascism in
general (Segerstråle 2001).
What all this suggests is that the worries many people
have about evolution and the teaching of evolution are not
always and only based on a commitment to creationism and
Biblical literalism. Evolution challenges some of our most
deeply entrenched philosophical commitments about human
nature. It challenges a widespread belief that humans are
somehow exempt from the laws of nature. This challenge in
turn naturally raises questions about justification not raised
by other less philosophically significant scientific theories. If
we want to fully understand the opposition to evolution and
the teaching of evolution, we need to understand these
philosophical challenges posed by evolution.
My interest in addressing these philosophical challenges
is motivated partly by my recent experience in the classroom
that has seen fewer worries about evolution based on a
creationist, Biblical literalism and more based on other
issues. It is also motivated by the public positions of many
scholars who seem to have reservations about evolution but
not on the grounds of a creationist Biblical literalism. Few
professional philosophers, for instance, are committed to a
traditional religious stance, but many still have seemingly
antievolutionary views, especially about humans. Similar
attitudes are found in other disciples of the humanities and
social sciences. We often take light notice of these other
antievolutionary stances, focusing almost exclusively on
opposition based on Biblical literalism. But by ignoring
these other antievolutionary stances, we might be missing
much of what is motivating the Biblical literalists as well.
In this essay, I will lay out what I believe to be the broader
philosophical challenges facing the teaching of evolution.
These challenges lie in the legitimate implications evolution
has for human nature and activities and the subsequent
demand for greater justification. I will begin with a brief
description of the evolution-themed courses I teach and the
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ways that antievolutionary attitudes are manifested. I then
sketch out a general worry that seems to be motivating at
least some of these antievolutionary attitudes, a worry that
originates in a variety of philosophical stances committed to
a human “exemptionalism,” which in turn has implications
about proper explanations of human nature and activities.
The problem is that a consistent evolutionary approach
seems to undercut human exemptionalism in a variety of
ways, and those committed to exemptionalism are loath to
accept the evolutionary principles that undercut it. I will then
explain the basic ways evolution seems to challenge
exemptionalism. Finally, I will conclude with a few thoughts
about how we might respond to these philosophical
challenges.
Before continuing, however, two clarifications are in
order. First, I will interpret the term ‘evolution’ broadly, to
refer to the basic theories advanced by Darwin (origin of
new species by modification, common ancestry, and change
primarily by natural selection), as well as the many modern
theoretical developments related to genetics, development,
and more. Second, my own views are that this cluster of
evolutionary theories is the only scientifically respectable
understanding of the origin of species; and these theories
are worth taking seriously because they are empirical—
testable by observation—and have been refined on the basis
of observation. Third, the implications of evolution are far-
reaching and will ultimately change our intellectual
landscape in profound ways. Philosophy in particular needs
to pay close attention to what evolution reveals about how
we think and what sorts of creatures we are.
Teaching Evolution at the University of Alabama
I teach courses on and about evolution in some form or
other every semester at the University of Alabama, through
the philosophy department and an interdisciplinary honors-
type program. In the philosophy department, I regularly
teach a course titled “Philosophy and Evolution,” that
begins historically with readings from pre-Darwinian
theories of transmutation from Linnaeus (in the later
editions of his Systema Naturae) to Lamarck; the influences
on Darwin from Humboldt, Herschel, Lyell and Malthus;
and Darwin’s (1964; 1981) own writing from his essays of
1842 and 1858 to his On the Origin of Species, and Descent
of Man. Following this is often a section on the creationist
challenge and intelligent design. Then, we may follow with
some recent debates within evolutionary theory about
macroevolution, levels of selection, etc. Following that are
typical readings and discussions on human nature, race,
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, knowledge,
ethics, and more.
Evolution also makes an appearance in a variety of other
philosophy courses I teach as well. A course on “Theories
of Human Nature,” for instance, begins with traditional
religious theories from the ancient Hebrew, Christian, and
Asian traditions, then proceeds to the theories of the ancient
Greek philosophers, and continues on into modern Marxist,
Freudian, and ultimately Evolutionary theories. In a course
on American Pragmatism, we look at how Darwin’s
evolutionary approach influenced the “classic” pragmatists
Charles Pierce, William James, John Dewey, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, as well as contemporary pragmatists such
as Thomas Kuhn.
In three courses I teach for the interdisciplinary, Blount
Undergraduate Initiative, titled “Origins,” “Possibilities,”
and “Worldviews,” the coverage of evolution is less
systematic and focused. We may read and discuss historical
texts such as the 1858 essays of Wallace and Darwin, but
emphasis is placed on more contemporary texts from E. O.
Wilson (2000) and Stephen Jay Gould (2003), to the human
population geneticist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, neurosci-
entist Gerald Edelman, and developmental linguist Steven
Pinker. Non-evolutionary readings from literature and
philosophy are also included, and one focus in these
courses is the possibility of integrating evolutionary
approaches into the intellectual background constituted by
classic texts from Plato, Augustine, Shakespeare, Descartes,
John Locke. John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Adam Smith, and
more. We might ask, for instance, if and how the
understanding of human nature derived from evolutionary
biology can help us evaluate the political theories of Plato,
Mill, Marx, and Smith. And we try to understand how
evolutionary neuropsychology might illuminate the roles of
reason and imagination we find represented in Shake-
speare’s Tempest or Descartes Meditations. Discussions in
these classes often range far and wide, encompassing
debates about religion, race and gender relations, civil and
economic liberties, rights and obligations, individualism
versus collectivism, and more.
The “Philosophy and Evolution” class rarely has any
students committed to a creationism based on Biblical
literalism. This is partly due to a self-selection, in that
students who do not accept evolution are less likely to take
a class organized around it. This is not to say, however, that
there are no antievolutionary tendencies among the stu-
dents. These tendencies rarely come out when discussing
evolution in general, or of nonhuman species. Like the
response to E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology in 1975, when
discussion turns to Homo sapiens, the worries and
objections start to appear. One worry appears when we
discuss the application of “population thinking” to humans.
One of Darwin’s conceptual innovations was the
recognition of constant and inevitable variability within a
species and across geographic ranges and the incorporation
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of this variability into his theorizing. Evolution not only
implies that members of species vary, but that they must
vary if there is to be natural selection and change. While
Darwin had already been working on developing his
evolutionary theories from 1837 on in his transmutation
notebooks, it was not until he began his 8-year-long studies
of barnacles in 1846 that he became convinced that
variation was the rule rather than the exception. Few of
my students worry about variation among barnacles, but
many worry about variation among humans. If humans vary
in general, there will be variation not just in physical traits
but also in mental and behavioral traits. Worse, there may
be variability across geographic ranges. Worse still, this
variability is the basis for the natural selection and
evolution of humans. Some humans are just better adapted
to particular environments. Does this mean that humans are
not all “equal”? And if so, does it imply that we can treat
different people differently?
This worry typically gets raised in my interdisciplinary
classes as well. In these classes, we explicitly address
political theories and their assumptions about human
nature. One question we sometimes address is whether
population thinking has implications for the notion that “all
men are created equal” we find in the writings of John
Locke and incorporated into the Bill of Rights. The obvious
reply is that political equality does not rely on the empirical
assumption that people are all the same in traits and
abilities. But this reply rarely satisfies those who have the
worry. Students often point out that assumed biological
differences between human males and females have served
as justification for sexist policies of the past and might for
the future if we allow it. When pressed, students are
typically reluctant to admit that this is a worry just about
the consequences of accepting the evolutionary picture but
insist that there must also be something wrong factually
with the assumption that humans vary in these ways.
The existence of human races similarly generates
controversy. The standard and apparently required view in
many of the courses on our campus is that human race is a
fiction with no biological basis. This is a claim endorsed by
many who have little or no knowledge of biological
systematics. Strikingly, there is little objection to the
postulation of “races”—as geographic varieties—in other
species. Geographic varieties and subvarieties of fish
species, for instance, are no problem at all, while
geographic varieties and subvarieties of H. sapiens seem
highly problematic and suspicious to many students. One
topic that can generate lively discussion here is the use of
ethnic or “racial” information in medicine. Some in the
medical professions have argued that a medical doctor is
not only allowed to use knowledge of a person’s racial and
ethnic background to better diagnose and treat disease, but
professional obligation requires it where useful. Whether or
not there really are human races in the sense of geographic
variability, the topic generates considerable interest and
passion.
Another worry appears when discussion turns to evolu-
tionary psychology and the adaptive hypotheses of human
traits that explain traits in terms of their postulated
advantages for survival and reproduction. Adaptive hy-
potheses are not problematic as long as we restrict our
discussion to approved human traits such as intelligence,
sympathy, altruism, etc. Students rarely object to the
hypothesis, for instance, that sympathy and what Darwin
called the “social instincts” are adaptations to the human
social environment. But when we turn to undesirable traits,
such as tendencies to violence, territoriality, and xenopho-
bia, attitudes in the classes change sharply. Many students
are not sure what they object to here, but object they do.
One initial response is to see these adaptive hypotheses as
just “excusing” undesirable behavior so we don’t have to
try to change it. Another response sees these adaptive
hypotheses as justification of the status quo to the
advantage of those who benefit. Here again, while students
will typically admit that it is the consequences of accepting
the adaptive hypotheses in question that bother them, they
are also loath to say it is just the consequences. There must
be something wrong with the factual basis of the adaptive
hypotheses.
In each of these worries about evolution, relative to
population thinking, human races, and adaption hypotheses,
there seems to be little or no appeal to Biblical literalism.
And while the worries seem to begin with the assumed
consequences of accepting evolution, rarely is it agreed that
it is just the consequences. Students assume that there must
be something wrong with the factual basis as well. This is
puzzling. Most of these students accept the fundamental
premises of evolution that seem to be problematic—the
importance of population thinking, the existence of geo-
graphic varieties, and the adaptive value of many traits—
but they just don’t accept their application to humans.
There is, I believe, a way to make sense out of all of this,
and I will try to do so in the next section.
Exemptionalism and Antievolutionism
In the first two books of Genesis, we get two different and
not obviously consistent stories of the human creation. The
most obvious response would be to see it as a problem for
Biblical literalism, but what is more important, for purposes
here, is the underlying conception of human nature. In
Genesis, humans are special and different from other
creatures, being made in “God’s image.” What precisely
this means, we are not told, but one standard way to think
about human nature theologically is in terms of a human
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“soul.” Humans are what they are because they have a God-
created soul that somehow reflects God’s nature. If so, then
whatever else this might involve, all those with such a
divine soul are in some sense identical by virtue of having
such a soul. René Descartes (1993) developed this idea
within the framework of his metaphysical dualism, most
strikingly in his Meditations.
According to Descartes there are two kinds of sub-
stances, a material, extended substance and an immaterial,
thinking substance. For humans, these substances are joined
together—a physical, extended body joined with an
unextended thinking substance or soul. As students in
introductory philosophy courses learn, this leads to a
problem in mind–body causal interaction. First, it is not
obvious how an extended material substance can cause
effects in a nonmaterial, non-extended thinking substance
and how the body can in turn be affected by the thinking
substance. Second, because the laws of nature only apply to
the extended, material substance, the non-extended, imma-
terial part of human nature—the soul—is not subject to the
laws of nature. In contrast, nonhuman creatures are only of
material body, and not thinking substance, and therefore
fully subject to these laws. On the Cartesian account then,
humans fit into the causal nexus of the world in a very
different way than other species fit. The downside is the
difficulty in seeing how humans can causally interact with
the world, but the upside is that because we have a
nonmaterial soul, we can act in ways that are outside the
normal patterns of cause and effect. We, unlike other
creatures, can transcend the laws of nature!
This dualism allowed Descartes to develop his physics
without worries about its implications for human morality,
in that it allowed for both a material, physical determinism
with a “metaphysical freedom of the will.” Material causes
can necessarily produce their effects in nature, without
thereby necessitating human action. For those who think it
must be possible for us to act in ways other than how we in
fact act to be acting freely and be morally responsible, this
is a convenient metaphysical stance. Because humans are
somehow outside the causal nexus of the world, they can be
morally responsible in the fullest sense in that they could
have acted differently. This “causal exemptionalism” is and
has been attractive to philosophers for a long time and
continues to be regarded as a respectable position in
metaphysics and ethics. But it also reflects a deep tendency
for humans to see themselves as somehow unique and
exempt from the laws of nature.
There are other ways to be an exemptionalist about
humans. One approach with a very long history, at least
going back to Plato and his tripartite conception of the soul,
is to see humans as different from other creatures on the
basis of their reason—the capacity for humans to self-
consciously think about themselves and the world, repre-
sent it, and have beliefs, preferences, desires, and fears
about it. The philosopher Christine Korsgaard (2006,
p. 116) seems to argue for such a “rationalistic exemption-
alism” (that she identifies with Kant) in response to the
arguments of primatologist Frans de Waal’s that we can
understand human moral behavior by analogy with that of
other primates.
… Kant speculated that the form of self-consciousness
that underlies our autonomy may also play a role in
the explanation of some of the other distinctively
human attributes—including culture, romantic love,
and the capacity to active from self-interest. Other
philosophers have noticed the connection of self-
consciousness of this sort of capacity for language. I
can’t go into those arguments here, but if they are
correct they would provide evidence that only humans
have this form of self-consciousness… If that is right,
then the capacity for normative self-government and
the deeper level of intentional control that goes with it
is probably unique to humans beings.
And:
A form of life governed by principles and values is a
very different thing from a form of life governed by
instinct, desire and emotion—even a very intelligent
and sociable form of life governed by instinct, desire
and emotions…We have ideas about what we ought to
do and to be like and we are constantly trying to live
up to them. Apes do not live in that way… Even if
apes are sometimes courteous, responsible and brave,
it is not because they think they should be…
(Korsgaard 2006, p. 117)
According to this sort of rationalistic exemptionalism,
human behavior has a different and unique set of causes—
causes based on self-conscious commitment to “principles
and values” as opposed to “mere” instinct and emotion.
Another form of exemptionalism can be found in the
approach that emphasizes the importance of culture for
humans. According to this “cultural exemptionalism”
(usually associated with the views of the anthropologist
Ruth Benedict (2006)), humans have escaped their biology
by virtue of their lives being so much a product of the
cultures they create—and that “creates” them. On this view,
humans—unlike other creatures—create a culture in which
they grow and live, a culture that determines their beliefs,
attitudes, values, and goals. This is an approach sometimes
associated with the “Standard Social Science Model” (see
Pinker (2002) for an analysis and critique of this sort of
exemptionalism).
Whichever version of exemptionalism one might accept,
there are implications for how human nature and behavior
are to be explained. If humans are not governed by
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precisely the same laws of nature that govern other
creatures, human nature and behavior cannot be explained
on precisely the same grounds as we might explain the
nature and behavior of other creatures. The proper
explanation of human activity and nature will therefore be
unique. For Descartes, it is not clear how one can explain
human behavior at all if there is no causal connection
between matter and mental substance—unless one is
willing to appeal to actions of a God to bridge this
metaphysical divide. For other versions of exemptionalism,
we can appeal to a standard sort of explanation recognized
and distinguished from causal explanation, typically de-
scribed as “intentional explanation.” Because humans have
the power to reason self-consciously and act on principles,
they are different from other species and must be explained
on different principles. We should therefore explain human
behavior in terms of things like principles, values and ideas,
or culture, rather than on the biology, emotion, and instincts
humans share with other creatures.
The Evolutionary Challenge
In these types of exemptionalism, humans are unique and
somehow transcend the laws of nature, by virtue of having
respectively, a soul, reason, or culture. Evolution does not
directly refute these exemptionalisms, but it does provide a
powerful non-exemptionalist alternative that has the full
force and authority of science behind it. When Darwin
addressed human nature in his Descent of Man, he made it
clear that humans were different from other creatures only
in terms of degree—not different in “kind.” Humans may
have reason, but so do other species, albeit to a lesser
extent. Humans may have culture and language, but so do
other species to a lesser extent. For Darwin, the existence of
human reason, culture, and language was explainable in
each case by the same principles—primarily natural
selection and sexual selection but also the effects of use
and disuse and the environment. Not even Darwin’s
supporters could all agree with him here, though. A. R.
Wallace, the codiscoverer of natural selection, believed that
all creatures could be explained on evolutionary principles—
except man, who ultimately could only be explained on the
basis of intervention by a divine designer. Other support-
ers of Darwin, Charles Lyell and Asa Gray, similarly
could not resist the temptation of this sort of divine
exemptionalism, which placed the explanation of human
nature ultimately outside the realm of natural law.
(Richards 1987, pp. 178–185)
The strategy of Wallace, Lyell, and Gray to preserve
exemptionalism by appeal to a God can be employed today
but not within an evolutionary framework. Evolution seems
to “naturalize” all human phenomena. It does this first by
assuming that all species, H. sapiens included, evolved by
modification from common ancestry. Because humans
evolved from a common ancestor shared with bonobos
and chimps, we share certain features. And second, because
we evolved on the basis of the same principles, our differ-
ences are explained in terms of these same principles—even
if these principles also produced differences in ability to self-
consciously reason, and create culture. There are no “nomic”
exceptions in evolutionary theory for humans—we are
constrained by the same natural laws that operate on other
species. This does not, of course, rule out a causal role for
culture and self-consciousness, but those factors must fit
consistently within the evolutionary framework. We do not
escape biology through reason and culture and we do not
become free by escaping biology.
The effort to preserve human exemptionalism can
potentially play out in many ways, including a commitment
to Biblical literalism, but two prominent ways seem to have
endured in the continuing objections to evolution based on
the alleged sins of “reductionism” and “genetic determin-
ism.” On the standard construal of the reductionism
objection, evolution commits us to the view that humans
are nothing more than their constituent molecules and
associated molecular and biochemical processes. Human
behavior is therefore to be explained in terms of these
“lower level” elements and processes. On the second and
related objection, these molecules, in the form of genes,
determine human behavior. If you have the gene for some
behavior, you exhibit it. These objections are remarkably
resilient and are made by both those who are ignorant of
evolutionary theory—and by those who know much,
including the biologist Richard Lewontin and paleontolo-
gist Stephen Jay Gould. Lewinton’s book Not in our Genes,
written with Steven Rose and Leon Kamin, is devoted in its
entirety to the refutation of determinism and reductionism,
as are many of the essays and books by Gould. One
prominent target of Lewontin and Gould is their colleague,
Edward O. Wilson. This is ironic because Wilson does not
work in any of the “reductionist” subdisciplines—genetics
or molecular biology—but works instead on whole organ-
isms in their environment and has long emphasized the role
of the environment in development.
I can hardly review here the debates over reductionism
and genetic determinism and the philosophical issues
involved. What is of interest, however, is the function
these arguments have sometimes served to preserve
exemptionalism. While I do not wish to deny that there
have been some biologists guilty of a single-minded
reductionism or genetic determinism, they are not the rule
but the exception. Geneticists in general are acutely aware
of the interaction of genes with other genes and the cellular
environment, as well as of the importance of the external
environment. No one informed about development thinks
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that all traits are determined just by the presence of a gene.
And no one who knows anything about whole organisms
thinks that anything is to be gained by focusing exclusively
on the molecular level. What may really be at issue is the
worry that biochemical and genetic “laws” are deterministic
and prevent humans from acting freely to change their lives
and societies for the better. There seems to be lurking here a
view much like the view described above, that humans
must somehow not be constrained by the laws of biology,
or they cannot have the free will required to be morally
responsible and the ability to better themselves and the
world. Lewontin and his coauthors seem to endorse such a
view in the final words of Not in Our Genes—even though
they credit biology with the unique human freedom.
For biological determinists we are unfree because our
lives are strongly constrained by a relatively small
number of internal causes, the genes for specific
behaviors or for predisposition to these behaviors. But
this misses the essence of the differences between human
biology and that of other organisms. Our brains, hands,
and tongues have made us independent of many single
major features of the external world. Our biology has
made us into creatures who are constantly re-creating our
own psychic and material environments, and whose
individual lives are the outcomes of an extraordinary
multiplicity of intersecting causal pathways. Thus, it is
our biology that makes us free. (Lewontin et al. 1984,
pp. 289–290; emphasis added)
There are other ways evolution seems to challenge the
various versions of exemptionalism, including its under-
standing of the human brain as based on an ancestral
“animal” foundation, the functioning and development of
individual nervous systems, and the role of chemical
signaling in human behavior. I can hardly address these
topics here except to note that they continue the process of
explaining human nature on the principles we use to explain
other creatures. In each case, they produce the worry that
humans are not really different in kind from other creatures
and do not have the capacity to act freely in the fullest,
metaphysical sense. The bottom line is that evolution seems
to challenge a very old tradition that sees human nature as
different in fundamental ways from animal natures. And it
implies, contrary to this tradition, that we really are subject to
the same laws that govern the rest of organic nature. We may
be smarter, we may have more complex cultures and means
of communicating, but we are not exempt from the processes
and principles that operate in nature. Even worse, just as
there is variability in form, behavior, and fitness in other
species, there is variability in form, behavior, and fitness of
the human species. We are not all the same.
Ironically, our resistance to evolution may be partly
explainable by evolution itself. The members of every
species, including humans, are cued in on other members of
their species and for obvious reasons. Mate recognition
systems tell us who can and cannot serve as an appropriate
and possible mate. Individuals who fail at this task lose at
the reproduction game. Moreover, because we are intensely
social creatures and depend in many ways on social
structures and interaction, we must strongly distinguish
members of our species from other species. The ability and
tendency to both identify and prefer conspecifics are
presupposed by the general qualities of animal sociality
identified by E.O. Wilson—group size, cohesiveness,
patterns of connectedness, differentiation of roles and
integration of behavior. (Wilson 2000, pp. 16–18) A group
of humans cannot have cohesiveness, for instance, unless
there is some preference for other humans. Furthermore, we
now know that certain structures in human brains are
associated with facial recognition and cue in only on human
faces. This is hardly surprising; the “speciesist” tendencies
lurking behind the various versions of exemptionalism are
surely useful for such social creatures as ourselves.
Conclusion
What I am arguing here is this: Evolution is more than just
any old scientific theory. It challenges any view that makes
humans different in kind from other animals and exempt
from the laws of nature. And it challenges any view that
presupposes human uniqueness, from a theological, crea-
tionist approach to those based on human reason and
culture. If we focus just on the theological, creationist
objection, we miss the full thrust of the evolutionary
challenge. We also misunderstand the demand, from a
variety of sources, for additional justification. If evolution
challenges our natural tendencies to see ourselves as
exempt from the laws of nature and metaphysically free,
then surely we will demand greater “proof.” Human
exemptionalism, in all its versions, is something we do
not want to give up and is perhaps what motivated my
students to object to population thinking in humans, the
existence of human races, and the adaptive hypotheses of
negative traits.
How should we respond to these challenges? First, we
need to recognize them in their full complexity. This
requires that we not focus solely on creationism and
Biblical literalism. These are indeed worth taking seriously
but may largely be rhetorical manifestations of a deeper
exemptionalism. Second, a full understanding of the
philosophical challenges requires both a philosophical
sensitivity to the various exemptionalist views and the will
to address them in the classroom. This does not thereby
imply that one needs to be a philosopher. Nonetheless,
philosophical sensitivity might help avoid several problem-
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atic responses. First is the insistence that evolution implies
atheism. While it is true that evolution undermines the
argument for design by providing an alternative nontheistic
explanation, it does not and cannot say anything about that
which transcends the natural world. A scientific stance must
remain agnostic about that which cannot be subject to
empirical investigation. My own view is that little is gained
in understanding the world by appeal to a God, and so we
should simply set the question aside. This is arguably the
view Darwin held, even near the end of his life. He writes
in his Autobiography: “The mystery of the beginning of all
things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to
remain an agnostic.” (Darwin 1958, p. 94)
The second problematic response is the insistence that
evolution is a ‘fact’ and that is all there is to it. The obvious
problem with this is the analogy with other scientific
hypotheses that were once regarded as facts, but turned out
to be false in some way. At the end of the nineteenth
century, one standard view was that in Newtonian physics
we had uncovered the most fundamental secrets of nature,
and the task of science was just in mopping up the details.
This was, of course, before the relativistic and quantum
revolutions that seemed to falsify the prevailing theories of
time, gravity, matter, and more. To just claim evolution is a
‘fact’ and cannot be questioned is to ignore the history of
science and all its complexities. In my experience, it is also
counterproductive, diminishing the authority of the support
for evolution. If we say something so clearly problematic,
what authority do we lose with our students?
What we can do instead is to acknowledge that no
scientific theory is immune to revision, including evolution.
We can highlight the empirical nature of evolution and how
that makes it revisable in light of future discoveries.
Evolutionary theory has been successful precisely because
it is revisable in light of new observations and theorizing.
Furthermore, it is the only theory of biological origins that
has had this kind of success. In my own view, it will
eventually give us the theoretical resources to revise and
perhaps even replace the traditional intentional explanations
that philosophers, cultural anthropologists, and others have
focused on and that have grounded various exemptionalist
approaches. (This is not to say that we will replace in-
tentional explanations in our everyday lives, however.)
Perhaps the strongest argument for evolution is something
that many students might already accept: the power of
science in general to predict, understand, and change the
world around us can be found in our theories of evolution.
To set aside our best understanding of our origins on the
grounds of our own worries about the uniqueness of
humanity is to act contrarily to our own best understanding
of the world. By opposing evolution, we are rejecting the
best tools we have to understand ourselves and our place in
the world.
This answer will obviously not satisfy everyone. Those
who use antievolutionary arguments to generate political
power or raise money, for instance, may not be so
concerned with the considerations offered here. And those
who have been so indoctrinated in an antievolutionary
stance that they cannot consider the arguments at all are
beyond our influence as well. Nonetheless, humans are the
kinds of creatures that at least sometimes respond to
arguments and ideas—even if we can never free ourselves
from the biological foundations for reason and self-
conscious deliberation. This fact points toward one of the
more interesting implications of an evolutionary approach
to human nature: that we can formulate and test theories of
evolution is itself a product of evolution. How can we then
incorporate this ability, and its basis in reason and self-
conscious deliberation, into a comprehensive and evolu-
tionary understanding of ourselves and our place in nature?
And how can we better understand its product—evolutionary
theory—on such a basis? I have no answer here to these
questions, but a thoroughgoing and consistent evolutionary
approach demands that we eventually ask them. Scientific
theories are themselves part of nature and subject to the
principles that govern nature.
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